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Abstract
This paper analyses intergenerational earnings mobility in Spain correcting
for different selection biases. We address the co-residence selection problem by
combining information from two samples and using the two-sample two-stage
least square estimator. We find a small decrease in elasticity when we move to
younger cohorts. Furthermore, we find a higher correlation in the case of daugh-
ters than in the case of sons; however, when we consider the employment selec-
tion in the case of daughters, by adopting a Heckman-type correction method,
the difference between sons and daughters disappears. By decomposing the
sources of earnings elasticity across generations, we find that the correlation be-
tween child’s and father’s occupation is the most important component. Finally,
quantile regressions estimates show that the influence of the father’s earnings is
greater when we move to the lower tail of the offspring’s earnings distribution,
especially in the case of daughters’ earnings.
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1 Introduction
Intergenerational mobility refers to the association between socio-economic achieve-
ments of parents and those of their children. If we believe that equal opportunity is
a desirable characteristic of society, a high degree of intergenerational mobility is an
important indicator of the healthiness and success of society. In this context, children
from different families are not predetermined by their parents and have equal options
to achieve education and higher earnings (Behrman and Taubman (1990)).
Intergenerational mobility studies usually estimate the correlation between socio-
economic status of parents and their offsprings. On one hand, a high correlation would
imply that people born in disadvantaged families have a smaller chance to occupy
the highest socio-economic positions than those born in privileged families. On the
other hand, a zero correlation would imply a high degree of mobility and more equal
opportunities. Economists have primarily concentrated on the relationship between
parents and their offsprings’ permanent incomes or earnings, while sociologists explore
the association measures between ordered categorical variables, such as social and
economic class position.1
In this paper, we follow the economic approach and focus on intergenerational mo-
bility measured by the intergenerational elasticity of offsprings’ earnings with respect
to their fathers’ earnings. However, the estimation of intergenerational mobility can
be bias due to different sample selection problems. Therefore, the main objective of
this paper is to study intergenerational earnings mobility in Spain and attempt to
correct the associated main sample selection problems.
Why Spain? The literature on intergenerational earnings mobility has been concen-
trated in the United States, Canada, and some European countries, including England,
Scandinavian countries, Germany, and France. However, there is comparably less evi-
dence for the intergenerational mobility in southern European countries, probably due
to the lack of long panels. As far as we know, the only exception is the study of
Mocetti (2007) wherein he explores intergenerational earnings mobility in Italy.
As in other southern European countries, Spain experiences stronger intergenera-
tional family bonds compared to other countries. Indeed after leaving home, children
1See Solon (1999), Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (2000), Bowles and Gintis (2002), Erikson and Godthorpe
(2002) for a review.
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maintain a close relationship with parents. Therefore, it is valuable to explore how
earnings mobility in Spain is compared to other countries, and it is particularly inter-
esting to compare our results to those obtained by Mocetti (2007) for Italy.
Intergenerational mobility in Spain has primarily been studied by sociologists. For
example, Caraban˜a (1999) studied occupational mobility. From an economic point
of view, Hugalde (2004) is the only study for Spain that analyses intergenerational
mobility. She analyses the intergenerational income and education mobility using the
Family Expenditure Survey (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares) for 1980 and 1990;
however, she only estimates the elasticity when children and their fathers live together.
As previously mentioned, we try to correct the main selection problems. One
of these problems arise from the fact that, in a panel, we have information regarding
offsprings’ and parents’ earnings when they live together in at least one wave; however,
the probability of observing offspring living with their parents decreases as the children
grow older. Thus, in short panels, it is impossible to follow children during their adult
life. This generates a bias in the estimation of intergenerational correlation. Following
Nicoletti and Francesconi (2006) we can refer to this sample selection problem as
co-residence selection.2 This selection problem is particularly important in Spain,
where we have only short panels, and thus, do not have information on both children’s
and their fathers’ permanent earnings. When we have information regarding the father,
the children are too young to observe their permanent earnings, and when we have
adults, we do not have information about their father’s earnings.
In order to overcome this selection problem, it is possible to consistently estimate
intergenerational earnings mobility using the two-sample two-stage least square es-
timator.3 This method combines information from two separate samples: a sample
of adults (sons and daughters) with observations of their earnings and their parents’
characteristics, and a sample of potential parents with observations on earnings and
2Nicoletti and Francesconi (2006) analyse intergenerational mobility using an occupational prestige
score. They find that the β coefficient (in this case β represents the elasticity between father and
offspring occupational prestige scores) is underestimated when they only consider the pairs of children
and parent who are cohabiting.
3This method is asymptotically equivalent to the two-sample instrumental variable developed by
Angrist and Krueger (1992), Arellano and Meghir (1992) and Ridder and Moffit (2006) and has been
already applied to the study of intergenerational mobility by Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (1997) in Sweden;
by Fortin and Lefebvre (1998) in Canada; by Grawe (2004)) in Ecuador, Nepal, Pakistan, and Peru;
by Lefranc and Trannoy (2004) in France; by Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) in Britain; and by Mocetti
(2007) in Italy.
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the same characteristics. The latter sample is used to estimate an earnings equation
for parents using their characteristics as explanatory variables, while the former is used
to estimate an intergenerational earnings equation by replacing the missing parents’
earnings with its best linear prediction.
The second problem we try to correct is the employment selection, wherein we
only have earnings for adults who are employed. Since the decision to work or not work
is not random, especially in the case of women, estimating intergenerational earnings
mobility only for those who are working gives us biased estimators. We deal with this
selection problem, in the case of daughters, by using the Heckman-type of correction
estimation described in Vella (1998) and used in Ermisch, Francesconi, and Siedler
(2006).
Thus, the main contribution of this paper is the analyze of intergenerational earn-
ings mobility in Spain for all adults, that is, those who live and those who do not live
with their parents. Another important contribution of our paper is the consideration
of employment selection. As a result, we take into account the two major selection
problems of the short panel. Furthermore, we investigate more of the characteristics
of this earnings transmission through two exercise. First, we do a decomposition of
the sources of earnings elasticity, and second, we investigate the influence of fathers’
earnings by quantiles.
When we correct for the co-residence selection problem, we find an elasticity of
0.38 for sons between 30 and 40 years old and an elasticity of 0.42 for sons between
40 and 50 years old. In the case of daughters, we obtain elasticities of 0.50 and 0.58
respectively. We thus find a slightly lower elasticity when we move to younger cohorts.
Furthermore, we obtain lager elasticities for daughters; however, when we consider the
employment selection in regard to women, the differences disappear. By decomposing
the sources of earnings correlations, we find that the correlation between children’s
and father’s occupation is the most important component. A father’s occupation is a
good indicator of his social position and is better than his education as a predictor of
his children’s earnings.
Finally, we estimate the elasticity between children’s and fathers’ earnings by quan-
tiles. We find that the influence of the fathers’ earnings is greater when we move to
the lower tail of the distribution, especially in the case of daughters. By comparing
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the elasticities obtained in Spain with the results for other countries, we find that
intergenerational mobility in Spain is similar to mobility in France, is lower than in
Nordic countries and Britain, and is higher than in Italy and the United States.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we present a
very simple theoretical framework that allows us to understand some of the sources
of earnings transmission between generations. Section 3 describes how we implement
the two-sample two-stage least square estimator. In Section 4 we describe the data
source, the selection sample, and the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section
5 reports the results, and finally, Section 6, concludes with some final remarks.
2 Sources of earnings transmission
Why do some children obtain better jobs and higher earnings when they become adults,
while others do not? Which are the channels through which earnings are transmitted?
As Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) point out, an important number of institutions
affect intergenerational mobility, like the educational system, the labour market, the
family (particularly its investment in children). Furthermore, public policy affects
these institutions and hence the intergenerational mobility.
Following Checchi (2006) and Lefranc and Trannoy (2004), we present here a simple
model that allows us to better understand some of the sources of intergenerational
earnings transmission.4
Let us suppose an individual belonging to family i and to generation t, whose
permanent earnings Wit derives from two components: ability endowment Ait, and
human capital (i.e., education Eit). If we do not consider on-the-job training, education
is previous to get into the labour market, and is therefore, with respect to earnings.
If we consider the fact that ability increases labour productivity, we can express these
channels as follows:
Wit = λEit + piAit + µit (1)
Where the relationship between earnings, education and ability is assumed to be
linear for simplicity, and µit is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) error
4Here we will summarise the main channels of earnings transmission; however, most of these
channels are the same when we analyse the transmission of income.
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term that captures the idea of luck in the labour market.
Education is one of the most important channels of intergenerational earnings
transmission. We represent the education of previous generation by Eit−1. Education
attainment can be determined by the cultural influence of the family (described by η).
There is a large body of empirical evidence about how children of educated parents
are more likely to acquire education. As Checchi (2006) points out, this may be partly
due to parent imitation, but in most cases, it works through induced educational
choices. An educated parent is better aware of the psychological and economic value
of education, and therefore, puts more pressure on his or her children to achieve more
at school.
Furthermore, in the presence of liquidity constraints, education is also determined
by family earnings, reducing the optimal investment into education by poor families.
We indicate this channel with the γ and we write:
Eit = ηEit−1 + γWit−1 (2)
Therefore, education is determined by the education and earnings of the previous
generation; however, if we substitute Eit−1 with the expression with one-period lag
successively we can observe that education depends on the earnings of the parents,
grandparents, and previous generations.
The second component we have in equation 1 is ability. Considering that ability
is genetically (or mechanically) inherited, we can indicate this effect with α, while
t− 1 represents again the previous generation. Ability can influence earnings directly
through the type of job obtained because people with greater ability are more produc-
tive. Therefore, we have:
Ait = αAit−1 (3)
This component can be thought of as some aspects of earnings determinants that
“money can’t buy”, and at the same time, are transmitted from one generation to
the next. Examples of this are the transmission of intelligence quotient (IQ), social
network, and preferences.
Another source of intergenerational earnings persistence emerges from territorial
segregation. One’s neighbourhood can influence earnings through education (better
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quality of schools) or through social capital (good neighbours allow to obtain better
jobs). Neighbourhoods with better schools and better neighbours generally have higher
house prices. Therefore, at the end, residential choices are determined by family
earnings.
Another channel is networks per se. Obtaining a good and well-paid job may
depend on friends and social networks rather than on one’s curriculum.
We consider the combined effect of family networking and residential choices on
offspring’s earnings. Since both components are related to family earnings, we indicate
this channel with the θ and extend equation 1 with an additional term:
Wit = λEit + piAit + θWit−1 + µit (4)
Taking into account each of these channels, we can observe that intergenerational
persistence is a dynamic system. From an empirical point of view, it is not easy to
distinguish between alternative explanations of intergenerational persistence of earn-
ings. It is important to note, that in a simple regression of child’s earnings on parents’
earnings, the coefficient will simultaneously capture all of the effects “that money can
buy”. Hence, standard estimates of intergenerational earnings regressions will provide
an upward-biased estimates of the causal effect of fathers’ earnings on their children’s
earnings. Concretely, we will estimate:
Wit = βWit−1 + µit (5)
However, from a policy point of view, the distinction between the different compo-
nents matters to the prediction of the impact of economic policies or to the knowledge
of which policy could better improve mobility.
3 Estimation method
3.1 The econometric model
As we explained above, we focus on intergenerational mobility measured by the inter-
generational elasticity of offsprings’ earnings with respect to fathers’ earnings. More
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precisely, we consider the following intergenerational mobility equation:
Wit = α + βWit−1 + µit (6)
where Wit is the offspring’s log earnings, Wit−1 is the fathers’ log earnings (the
earnings of the previous generation), α is the intercept term representing the average
change in the child’s log earnings, and µ is a random error i.i.d. with a zero mean
and is homoscedastic. The coefficient β is the intergenerational elasticity of offspring’s
earnings with respect to their father’s earnings, and it is our parameter of interest.
Let ρ be the correlation between Wit and Wit−1; then β is related to ρ by the
following equation:
β = ρ
σWit
σWit−1
(7)
where σ is the standard deviation. In other words, the coefficient is related to the
correlation between children’s and fathers’ log earnings. In particular, the coefficient
β will be exactly equal to ρ when: σWit−1 = σWit .
On one hand, when β = 0, children’s earnings are not determined by their fathers’
earnings. On the other hand, a value of β = 1 represents a situation of complete
immobility, that is, children’s earnings are fully determined by their fathers’ earnings.
Generally, the coefficient is between these two values. Therefore, to really evaluate if
the coefficient is high or low, it is necessary to compare the results to those found for
other countries.
If we had permanent income for successive generations in our sample, we would
directly estimate equation 6 using the ordinary least square estimator without any
problem. Unfortunately, we do not have this information in one data set.
First, most data sets only provide measures of current earnings and fail to provide
measures of individual permanent income. Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) show
that the use of current earnings as a proxy for permanent earnings leads to downward
OLS estimates of β. Different solutions can be implemented to reduce or eliminate
this bias. If we work with panel data, we can calculate an average of current earnings
over several years as a proxy of permanent income. Another possibility lies in using
instrumental variables to estimate β. In this paper, in the case of the father’s earnings,
we estimate it by using auxiliary variables. Therefore, the estimated earnings is an
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average that can be considered as a proxy of the father’s permanent earnings. In the
case of children, we select adult ages as close as possible to the age in which earnings
are similar to permanent income. In particular, Haider and Solon (2006) suggests the
use of offsprings around 40 years old.
Second, we also have other selection problems that lead us to inconsistent estima-
tions of β. In the next subsection, we describe the main selection problems that we
face and how we solve them in this paper.
3.2 Sample selection problems
The estimation of intergenerational earnings mobility can frequently be biased due to
different sample selection problems. The two most important selection problems we
experience in short panels are co-residence selection and employment selection.5
Following Nicoletti and Francesconi (2006), we define co-residence selection to the
fact that we only observe earnings for pairs of parents and children when they live
together in at least one wave of the panel. On the contrary, we do not have information
for sons and daughters who never co-reside with their parents during the panel. This
selection problem could lead to an sub-estimation of the offsprings’ earnings, since
their living in the parental household is due to the fact they are still students or
they do not have enough income to live emancipated. Thus, they are not a random
sample. In general, this selection problem causes an overestimation of intergenerational
mobility (an underestimation of the elasticity between parents’ earnings and offsprings’
earnings).
If the panel is long, we do not have to deal with this selection problem, as it is
easy to observe young children living together with their parents and follow them to
adulthood to know their earnings, except if they leave the panel (attrition problems)
or if they do not have a job (employment selection).
In this paper we deal with this selection problem linking two samples as we will
explain in the next subsection. We use one sample with information on adults and the
characteristics (occupation, education, age) of the parents when the children are be-
5Only few papers on intergenerational mobility deal with these selection problems. For the employ-
ment selection, see, for example, Couch and Lillard (1998), Minicozzi (2003), Ermisch, Francesconi,
and Siedler (2006), Nicoletti and Francesconi (2006). For the case of co-residence selection, there are
fewer, see Couch and Lillard (1998), Comi (2003) and Nicoletti and Francesconi (2006).
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tween 12 and 14 years old, and another sample with the same parental characteristics,
but also with their earnings.
The employment selection refers to the problem wherein we only observe earn-
ings for adults when they are employed; however, the decision to work or not to work
is not random, especially in the case of women. Therefore, those who are working are
a self-selected sample. Estimating intergenerational earnings mobility exclusively for
those who are working yields biased estimators. We deal with this selection problem
in the case of daughters by using the Heckman-type of correction estimation described
in Vella (1998) and used in Ermisch, Francesconi, and Siedler (2006). In particular,
the variables included in the selection equation are dependent children, marital status,
age and father’s earnings. In all regressions, these are good predictors of participation.
3.3 Intergenerational elasticity with sample selection
As we mention above, the co-residence selection problem can be solved if we have char-
acteristics of the fathers because we can use them as auxiliary variables to impute their
earnings. This is what we do when we use the two-sample two-stage least squares esti-
mator (TS2SLS). This estimator is asymptotically equivalent to the two-sample instru-
mental variable estimator (2SIV) described by Angrist and Krueger (1992), Arellano
and Meghir (1992) and Ridder and Moffit (2006).6
Both estimators are consistent under the assumptions described in Angrist and
Krueger (1992). In particular, the two samples have to be independent random samples
to guarantee consistency. Furthermore, the instrumental variables common to both
samples have to be identically and independently distributed in the two samples.7
Since we do not have information of Wit−1, but do have a set of instrumental
variables Z of Wit−1, we can estimate equation 6 in two steps. As we have explained
before, we consider two independent samples: The first, which we call the main sample,
has data on offspring log earnings, Wit, and characteristics of their fathers, Z, while
the second, which we call the supplemental sample, has information on fathers’ log
earnings, Wt−1, and their age, education, and occupational characteristics, Z. In the
6For a detailed description of the properties of this estimator, see Arellano and Meghir (1992),
Angrist and Krueger (1992) and Ridder and Moffit (2006).
7The two estimators are numerically identical in the case of a single sample; however, when
combining two separate samples, the equivalence only holds asymptotically.
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empirical application, we combine the supplemental and the main sample to estimate
the intergenerational equation 6 by using the TS2SLS estimator.
In the first step, we use the supplemental sample to estimate a log earnings equation
for fathers using, as explanatory variables, their characteristics, Z, that is:
Wt−1 = Zt−1δ + vi (8)
In the second step, we estimate the intergenerational mobility equation 6 by using
the main sample and replacing the unobserved Wit−1 with its predictor,
Ŵit−1 = Zit−1δˆ, (9)
where δˆ are the coefficients estimated in the first step, and Z are the variables
observed in the main sample. As Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) point out, we can think
of this method as a cold-deck linear regression imputation. Cold-deck refers to the fact
that an external data source (the supplemental sample) is employed to estimate the
coefficients used to impute the missing Wit−1 in the main sample. Thus, we estimate
equation 6 by using the imputed fathers’ earnings.
Wit = α + β(Zit−1δˆ) + ui (10)
Equations 8 and 10 are estimated with ordinary least square estimator and standard
error of the estimates of equation 10 are corrected for heteroscedasticity.8 In order to
take into account the life-cycle profiles, the estimation of both equations includes
additional controls for individual’s and father’s ages.
The TS2SLS (2SIV) estimator is very similar to the classical IV estimator, using
Zit−1 as instrumental variables, except for the fact that the first step estimates are
taken from a different sample than in the second step.
In the previous studies that estimate intergenerational mobility combining two
different datasets, different variables have been used to impute the missing father’s
earnings. For example, Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (1997) use father’s education and occu-
pation. Grawe (2004) uses only the education levels, while Fortin and Lefebvre (1998)
uses only 16 occupational groups, which, as the authors admit, can affect the quality
of the imputation of earnings for fathers. Lefranc and Trannoy (2004) instead use
8Heteroscedasticity is corrected by using the Huber White estimator.
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eight different levels of education, seven occupational groups, and age. In Nicoletti
and Ermisch (2007), the set of candidates as instrumental variables is also quite large,
and the researchers try different combinations of the available instrumental variables .
Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) express how important it is to choose instrumental
variables that are strongly correlated with the variable to be instrumented because, if
they are not, we will obtain inconsistent estimates. Therefore, we have to choose the
instruments such that the R2 of the regression can be as high as possible.
4 Data Sources and Sample Selection Rules
As we explained above, we combine two separate samples to estimate intergenerational
earnings mobility, a main sample and a supplemental sample.
In our case, the main sample is the Survey of Living Conditions (Encuesta de
Condiciones de Vida (ECV)) for the year 2005, that is, the Spanish component of the
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).9
The ECV has annually interviewed a sample of about 14,000 households represen-
tative of the Spanish households, and has keep each household in the sample for four
years. Personal interviews are conducted at approximately one-year intervals with
adult members of all the households.
From the ECV, we have information about adults’ earnings and a set of character-
istics of their fathers when they were between 12 and 14 years old.
Our supplemental sample is the Family Expenditure Survey of 1980-1981 (Encuesta
de Presupuestos Familiares). This survey was designed with the purpose of estimat-
ing consumption and the weights of the different goods used in the consumer price
index. In addition, we also have information regarding earnings, occupation, and the
education level of the head of the household. Thus, in this sample we have data on
the father’s earnings and the same set of their characteristics that are available in the
main sample.
Although we have the same characteristics in both samples, we have to recode some
variables to have an homogenous classification across surveys.10
9The EU-SILC is an instrument that aims to collect timely and comparable cross-sectional and
longitudinal multidimensional microdata on income, poverty, social exclusion, and living conditions.
This instrument is anchored in the European Statistical System (ESS).
10For a detailed description of the frequencies of the different characteristics in the main and
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Our main sample is composed by individuals, either the head of the household
or the spouse of the household head, born between 1955 and 1975, self-employed or
in paid employment, who report positive labour earnings and are full-time workers.
Thus, in the year 2005, these adults were between 30 and 50 years old and they were
12 or 14 years old between 1969 and 1989. This is the reason we use the Family
Expenditure Survey of 1980-1981 as the supplemental sample with which to estimate
fathers’ earnings.
We suppose that when the children were 12 or 14 years old, their fathers were
between 37 and 57 years old. Thus, when we estimate the fathers’ earnings regression
we select males between those ages.
As we have mentioned above, one problem that can bias intergenerational mobility
studies is measurement error with regard to earnings. Theoretically, we would like to
consider the intergenerational elasticity in long-run permanent earnings, but we can
observe earnings only in a single or a few specific years. Thus, the question is, what is
the age at which the current earnings should be observed to provide a closest measure
of permanent earnings? Haider and Solon (2006) show that it is reasonable to choose
sons around age 40 and fathers with ages between 31 and 55. Therefore, assuming that
these results hold for other countries, we choose similar age intervals in our empirical
application.
After the exclusions, we have a total of 4,352 pairs, and in this sample, we have
fathers and children employed that reported positive earnings.
The earnings variable we use in all the specifications is the log of current gross
annual earnings, which is almost directly collected (not imputed), and is not distorted
by the national taxation system.
Tables 1 and 2 present the principal descriptive statistics of our final sample of sons
and daughters, respectively. Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix show the transition
matrices between fathers and children. These tables give us an intuitive vision of the
persistence of earnings or education.
supplemental samples see table A.1 in the Appendix.
13
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Sons in the main sample after exclusions.
sons 30-40 sons 40-50
Observations 1,334 1,322
annual earnings 19,728.35 22,403.7
log of annual earnings 9.72 9.84
Education
Primary education 13.49% 19.48%
Secondary education (first step) 24.47% 25.00%
Secondary education (second step) 25.42% 24.59%
Vocational qualification 2.64% 1.73%
Higher education (university) 33.97% 29.21%
Occupation
Higher-grade professionals 5.01% 6.6%
Higher-grade manager 11.65% 10.94%
Low grade professional 12.06% 9.97%
Routine non-manual employees high grade 7.99% 10.80%
Routine non-manual employees low grade 10.98% 9.28%
Skilled agriculture workers 2.37% 3.09%
Skilled manual workers 23.51% 22.70%
Low grade technician 12.33% 13.69%
Unskilled workers 14.09% 12.93%
5 Results
5.1 Main Results
In this section, we present the empirical results on intergenerational mobility estima-
tion with corrections to the sample selection problems. As we have explained before,
we use a two-sample two-stage estimation, whose first step consists of the estimation
of the fathers’ earnings regression using the supplemental sample. The results of this
regression are presented in table 3. These coefficients are then used to impute the
fathers’ earnings in the main sample, since we have the same characteristics in both
samples (main and supplemental). Therefore, in the second step, using the coefficients
from the supplemental sample and the characteristics of the main sample, we estimate
earnings for each father in the main sample.
Table 4 reports the second step, the coefficients of the intergenerational regression
between annual children’s earnings (sons and daughters) and the fathers’ imputed
earnings correcting the co-residence selection problem. In all columns, the father’s
predicted log earnings has a significant positive effect on child’s earnings.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Daughters in the main sample after exclusions
daughters 30-40 daughters 40-50
Observations 875 821
annual earnings 13,539.65 15,584.45
log of annual earnings 9.2 9.31
Education
Primary education 10.39% 17.44%
Secondary education (first step) 19.95% 21.54%
Secondary education (second step) 21.78% 23.35%
Vocational qualification 2.35% 1.11%
Higher education (university) 45.52% 36.67%
Occupation
Higher-grade professionals 1.59% 1.96%
Higher-grade manager 17.44% 19.54%
Low grade professional 11.68% 9.90%
Routine non-manual employees high grade 21.76% 16.89%
Routine non-manual employees low grade 21.08% 19.80%
Skilled agriculture workers 0.91% 0.85%
Skilled manual workers 4.85% 5.38%
Low grade technician 2.35% 1.71%
Unskilled workers 18.35% 23.98%
We estimate the elasticity for sons and daughters for two different cohorts, those
whose ages are between 30 and 40 and those who are between 40 and 50 in 2005. For
sons (first and second columns), regression coefficients are 0.38 for the first cohort and
0.42 for the second cohort. In the case of daughters (third and fourth columns), the
elasticities are 0.50 and 0.58, respectively.
We observe smaller correlations for the younger cohorts. Therefore, the intergen-
erational mobility in Spain has increased, and the younger cohorts earnings are less
correlated with father’s as earnings compared to the older cohort.
By comparing the estimates for sons and daughters, we obtain a higher correlation
for daughters. If we recall that our sample is restricted to full time workers, this
result should not be surprising. It is likely that full time women workers are not a
random group. The increase in female labour force participation in Spain began at
the end of the 70s, but this participation is still presently lower than that of men. It
is intuitive that full-time women workers are probably more common in some types of
household (highly educated households or very poor households), thus the correlation
is higher. It will be interesting to know if this difference between women and men is
15
Table 3: First step: estimates of father’s earnings equation with the supplemental
sample
Dependent variable log father’s earnings
age 0.0571 (0.0211)
age square -0.0006 (0.0002)
Education
Primary education 0.1873 (0.0148)
Secondary education (first step) 0.3919 (0.0276)
Secondary education (second step) 0.5254 (0.0326)
Vocational qualification 0.5581 (0.0487)
Higher education (university) 0.8455 (0.0281)
Occupation
Higher grade manager -0.4381 (0.0404)
Low grade professional -0.0753 (0.0986)
Routine non-manual employees high grade -0.0913 (0.0279)
Routine non-manual employees low grade -0.3158 (0.0320)
Skilled agriculture workers -0.8155 (0.0306)
Skilled manual workers -0.1395 (0.0300)
Lower-grade technician -0.2009 (0.0298)
Unskilled workers -0.3177 (0.0285)
Constant 11.9961 (0.4918)
Obs 5929
R2 0.402
Note: standard errors in parentheses. In Education: none (reference) and in Occupation: Higher-grade professionals
(reference).
Table 4: Second Step: Intergenerational regression in annual earnings in the main
sample
sons 30-40 sons 40-50 daughters 30-40 daughters 40-50
father’s earnings 0.380 (0.042) 0.427 (0.041) 0.504 (0.066) 0.582 (0.061)
age 0.140 (0.005) 0.022 (0.005) 0.028 (0.008) 0.010 (0.008)
Constant 4.258 (0.596) 3.315 (0.605) 1.829 (0.936) 1.513 (0.895)
Obs. 1334 1322 875 821
R2 0.061 0.08 0.072 0.10
Note:Dependant variable is log of annual labor earnings. Fathers earnings refers to the log of father annual labor
earnings. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
16
Table 5: Intergenerational earnings mobility for women correcting for employment
selection
daughters 30-40 daughters 40-50
father’s earnings 0.369 (0.074) 0.498 (0.062)
age 0.043 (0.009) 0.009 (0.008)
Constant 3.285 (1.042) 1.287 (0.919)
Obs. 1025 992
R2 0.072 0.10
Note:Dependant variable is log of annual labor earnings. Fathers earnings refers to the log of father annual labor
earnings. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
still important when we correct for this employment selection.
In Table 4 we have reported the estimation of intergenerational earnings mobility,
correcting only for the co-residence selection problem. Estimates in Table 4 assume
that labour market participation is random; however, this participation, especially for
women, is not random. In Table 5 we present the result of the estimation of equation 10
correcting for the employment selection in the case of daughters. We use the variables
married, having children, father’s earnings and age to predict selection. If we compare
the two last columns of Table 4 with data from Table 5, we observe some differences.
The elasticity between father’s earnings and daughter’s earnings is smaller when we
correct for the employment selection with a Heckman selection model. Furthermore,
the differences between sons and daughters disappear.
The figure of intergenerational earnings elasticity per se does not give a lot of
information. It is always useful to compare our estimates of intergenerational earnings
mobility in Spain with the results obtained for other countries. However, when we
want to compare our results, we should be aware of the potential impact of differences
in the definition of the children’s sample and the estimation method applied.
For example, in the US, depending on the study considered, we can observe a wide
range of elasticities, from 0.13 to 0.61. Solon (1999) provides an extensive survey
of the US results obtained in the 90s and concludes that a reasonable guess of the
intergenerational elasticity in long-run earnings for men in the United States is 0.4
or higher. This conclusion is obtained in studies using multi-year averages of father’s
and child’s earnings, computed from panel data, as a measure of individual permanent
income.
There are some studies that appear very close to our analysis because they use
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similar methodologies. One of these papers is Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (1997) for Sweden
and the US. They find an elasticity of 0.52 for the United State and 0.28 for Sweden.
Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) apply the same methodology for Britain, obtaining an
elasticity that ranges from 0.20 to 0.25 for sons. In the same way, Lefranc and Trannoy
(2004) find an elasticity of 0.40 for sons and 0.30 for daughters. Furthermore, Mocetti
(2007) show Italy as a very immobile society. In particular, he finds elasticities around
0.50. Thus, comparing these results with our estimations, we observe that Spain
presents less intergenerational mobility than that of Sweden, and Britain, more than
that of the United States and Italy and similar mobility than in France.
As Lefranc and Trannoy (2004) point out, one possible explanation for why Europe
shows more intergenerational mobility than the United States is the way in which
higher education is financed. In Spain, France, and Sweden the access to higher
education is free, while in the United States payment of tuition may be a problem for
poor households, even if generous grants are available for bright students.
Evidence available for other countries and surveyed by Solon (2002) suggest a
rather high degree of intergenerational mobility in Finland (O¨sterbacka (2001)) and
Canada (Corak and Heisz (1999)), where the elasticity is around 0.2 or lower. There
is some empirical evidence for Germany (see Couch and Dunn (1997)) that expresses
a similar correlation to the United States.
Overall, we find an intergenerational correlation for Spain that ranks between a
group of more mobile societies, including the Nordic countries, Canada, and Britain
and a group of less mobile countries, which include the United States and Italy. We
find an elasticity that is similar to France for sons; however, in the case of daughters
we obtain larger elasticities than those found in France.
5.2 Decomposing the earnings elasticity
Two-sample instrumental variable estimation allows for a decomposition of the sources
of earnings elasticity across generations. Using the decomposition developed by Bowles
and Gintis (2002) and followed by Lefranc and Trannoy (2004), we can express off-
springs’ and fathers’ earnings as:
Wit = Educ
c
i δ
c
educ +Occup
c
i δ
c
occup + µ
c
i for children
′s earnings (11)
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Wit−1 = Educ
f
i δ
f
educ +Occup
f
i δ
f
occup + µ
f
i for father
′s earnings (12)
where the supra-indices c and f are used to identify children’s and fathers’ charac-
teristics respectively. The variable Educ is the individual’s education, while Occup is
the individual’s occupation; these are the variables we have used to estimate fathers
earnings in the supplemental sample.11
Thus, the elasticity β is simply given by:
β =
cov(Wit , Educ
f
i δ
f
educ +Occup
f
i δ
f
occup)
V (Educfi δ
f
educ +Occup
f
i δ
f
occup)
Then, we can rewrite β as a decomposition of six terms:
β =
1
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]
Bowles and Gintis (2002) remark that it is important to consider this decomposition
as a descriptive device and not as an analysis of causal effects.
The results of applying this decomposition to the estimation of earnings elasticity
presented in table 4 are given in table 6
Table 6: Decomposition of earnings regression coefficient
sons 30-40 sons 40-50 daughters 30-40 daughters 40-50
educc − educf 0.065 0.084 0.081 0.094
occupc − occupf 0.143 0.152 0.161 0.187
educc − ocupf 0.080 0.082 0.105 0.110
occupc − educf 0.055 0.071 0.098 0.107
resc − educf 0.002 0.018 0.014 0.032
resc − occupf 0.035 0.020 0.045 0.052
total 0.380 0.427 0.504 0.582
As Lefranc and Trannoy (2004) observe, these results can be interpreted as, assum-
ing that the only channel of intergenerational earnings correlation would work through
11In order to provide an easy exposition, the variable age is ignored here; however, it is taken into
account in the empirical implementation of the decomposition.
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the correlation of the fathers’ and children’s education, the elasticity coefficient for sons
between 30 and 40 and fathers’ earnings would be equal 0.065.
Table 6 shows that, for all ages and for both sons and daughters, the correla-
tion between children’s and fathers’ occupations is the most important component
for understanding the intergenerational elasticity between earnings. Furthermore, the
correlation between the father’s occupation and his offspring’s educations is also im-
portant. If we add the influence of the father’s occupation on his child’s occupation
and education, we explain almost half of the intergenerational elasticity coefficient.
However, we can observe a slight contribution of the father’s education. This should
not be surprising, since the fathers of our sample, who now have adult children, have
lower educational levels than do their offspring. Therefore, their occupations are prob-
ably better than the education as indicators of their social position for predicting their
children’s earnings. These results are in line with those obtained by Lefranc and Tran-
noy (2004) in the decomposition for France and by O¨sterbacka (2001) for Finland.
They find that the most important component of the intergenerational correlation in
earnings is the correlation between fathers’ and children’s social positions.
5.3 Quantile regressions
When we regress the children’s earnings on their father’s earnings we provide a measure
of intergenerational mobility at the mean; however, it could be interesting to explore
if this correlation is similar or different at different points of the earnings distribution.
If we have homoscedasticity, the coefficient estimated at each percentile will be not
statistically different to the coefficient at the mean; however, in the presence of het-
eroscedasticity, we can obtain different coefficients. After testing the heteroscedasticity
with the white test in our sample, we reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity.12
Therefore, it could be interesting to estimate quantile regressions.
Are poor sons and daughters less or more determined by their father’s earnings? If
low-paid children are more influenced by their father’s earnings than are children with
higher salaries, then the intergenerational elasticity at the mean gives us an incomplete
picture of the correlation between fathers’ and children’s earnings
By estimating quantile regressions, we have a more complete picture of intergenera-
12The results of this exercise are available from the author.
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Table 7: Intergenerational mobility by quantiles
Average 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
sons 30-40 0.380 0.428 0.339 0.391 0.356 0.394
(0.042) (0.109) (0.762) (0.032) (0.059) (0.067)
sons 40-50 0.427 0.656 0.435 0.468 0.502 0.485
(0.042) (0.107) (0.059) (0.044) (0.044) (0.051)
daughters 30-40 0.504 ) 0.813 0.691 0.429 0.446 0.281
(0.066) (0.212) (0.124) (0.108) (0.065) (0.056)
daughters 40-50 0.582 0.938 0.864 0.724 0.641 0.410
(0.061) (0.177) (0.064) (0.067) (0.081) (0.069)
Note: Standard error for the estimated coefficients are in parenthesis. Average refers to mean regression, whereas q-th
indicates the q-th percentile regression.
tional transmission of earnings because we have information of the correlation between
children’s and parents’ earnings at different points of the distribution of the children’s
earnings.13
Mean regressions explain how the conditional mean of the children’s earnings de-
pend on parents’ earnings; however, quantile regressions explain how children earnings
depend on parents earnings at each specific quantile of the conditional distribution of
the children’ earnings given the fathers’ earnings.
In table 7, we can observe the coefficient of the father’s log earnings at different
points of the children’s earnings distribution. In the first column, we show the mean
regression, which tells us how important father’s earnings are on average. In the
rest of the columns, quantile regressions evaluate the influence of father’s earnings at
each specific quantile. We consider the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles.
We can observe that the influence of father’s earnings is greater as we move to the
poorest quantiles of the distribution. Thus, mobility is lower for the children born in
disadvantaged families. This pattern is particularly observed in the case of daughters,
where we can observe a monotonic decrease of the elasticity between fathers’ and
daughters’ earnings as we move to the richer percentiles. The results are in-line with
those obtained by Nicoletti (2008) for father’s and daughter’s occupations in Britain.
For sons, we obtain the highest elasticity at the 10th percentile. Thus, we also observe
low mobility for poor sons. However, when we move to richer percentiles the pattern
13Quantile regression is a statistical technique introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) that
allows us to estimate conditional functions by quantiles, at different points of the distribution.
21
is no longer monotonic, and the coefficients are quite close between them and similar
to the coefficients in the mean regression.
6 Final remarks
In this paper we analyse the intergenerational earnings mobility in Spain solving the
co-residence and the employment selection problems. Since there is no Spanish survey
with information on children and their fathers’ earnings covering a long period, we deal
with the co-residence selection using two separate samples: a main sample containing
information on children’s earnings and a set of characteristics of the fathers, and a
supplemental sample with the same characteristics for the fathers and their earnings.
We combine the two samples by using the two-sample two-stage least square estimator.
When we only correct for the co-residence selection problem we find an elasticity
of 0.38 for sons between 30 and 40 years old, an elasticity of 0.42 for sons between
40 and 50 years old. In the case of daughters, we obtain elasticities of 0.50 and 0.58,
respectively. We observe smaller correlation for the younger cohorts. Therefore, the
intergenerational mobility has increased in Spain. Younger cohorts’ earnings are less
correlated with father’s earnings as compared with the older cohort.
By comparing the estimates for sons and daughters, we obtain higher correlations
for daughter. However, since the participation in the labour market is not random,
especially for women, we estimate the earnings elasticity between daughters and fa-
thers correcting for the employment selection with the Heckman selection model. The
elasticity between father’s earnings and daughter’s earnings is smaller when we correct
for employment selection and the differences between sons and daughters disappear.
By decomposing the sources of earnings correlations, we find that the correlation
between children’s and father’s occupation is the most important component to under-
stand the intergenerational elasticity between earnings. Furthermore, the correlation
between father’s occupation and offspring’s education is also important. Adding the
influence of father’s occupation on children’s occupation and on children’s education
we explain almost half of the intergenerational elasticity coefficient. This should not
be surprising since the fathers of our sample, who now have adult children now, have
lower educational level than their offsprings. Thus, probably, their occupations are
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better than education as indicators of their social position in order to predict chil-
dren’s earnings.
Finally, estimating the elasticity between children’s and father’s earnings by quan-
tiles, we find that the influence of the father’s earnings is greater when we move to
the lower tail of the distribution, especially for daughters’ earnings. Thus, mobility is
lower for the children born in disadvantaged families.
According to our findings, Spain shows a degree of intergenerational earnings mo-
bility that is similar to France, lower than in the Nordic countries and in Britain and
higher than in the United States and in Italy.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Distribution of father’s education and occupation an coincidences between
supplemental and main sample
supplemental sample main sample
Observation 5,032 4,352
Education
No finish primary education 23.82 20.09
Primary education 51.28 57.65
Secondary education (first step) 8.46 6.08
Secondary education (second step) 5.90 5.84
Vocational qualification 2.07 0.49
Higher education (university) 8.47 9.85
Occupation
Higher grade professionals 9.25 8.04
Higher grade manager 4.28 3.70
Low grade professional 3.43 5.58
Routine non-manual employees high grade 11.04 6.18
Routine non-manual employees low grade 9.85 7.25
Skilled agriculture workers 12.74 12.85
Skilled manual workers 15.88 24.99
Lower-grade technician 13.81 11.82
Unskilled workers 19.71 19.60
Note: All frequencies are weighted using the respective sampling weights.
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Table A.2: Transition matrices of earnings between fathers and child
Quantil of the father
1 2 3 4 5
Quantil of
the son or
daughter
1 30,08% 23,93% 16,98% 16,20% 13,23%
2 24,40% 22,34% 19,17% 18,29% 16,20%
3 19,12% 23,54% 20,26% 21,67% 15,66%
4 15,74% 15,69% 22,64% 23,26% 22,41%
5 10,66% 14,50% 20,95% 20,58% 32,49%
Table A.3: Transition matrices of education between fathers and child
Education of the father
0 1 2 3 4 5
Education of
the child
1 34,07% 13,89% 4,85% 3,04% 0,00% 0,60%
2 34,77% 23,72% 18,12% 7,43% 8,00% 3,99%
3 17,98% 25,22% 34,30% 31,42% 36,00% 16,37%
4 1,90% 2,18% 1,94% 1,01% 12,00% 1,00%
5 11,29% 34,98% 40,78% 57,09% 44,00% 78,04%
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